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ABSTRACT: During the 19th century, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of 
continuity, according to which methods and explanatory patterns of biology should have an important 
say in the social sciences. In the 20th century, this thesis was considered unacceptable as part of the sharp 
separation of biology from the social sciences. Recent advances in the biological sciences suggest a way in 
which a version of the thesis of continuity can be reinstated, to suggest new ways of explaining innovation 
in the social sciences. Key kinds of innovation can be explained in terms of the evolution of robust com-
plex systems, interpreted as processes of path creation.
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RESUMEN: En el siglo xix la innovación tendía a modelarse utilizando la tesis de la continuidad según la 
cual los métodos y patrones explicativos de la biología deberían de tener algo importante que decir en las cien-
cias sociales. En el siglo xx esta tesis fue rechazada como parte de la separación disciplinar entre la biología y 
las ciencias sociales. Avances en las maneras de entender la innovación en la biología contemporánea sugieren 
una manera en la que una versión de la tesis de la continuidad puede ser restablecida como parte de nuevas 
maneras de explicar la innovación en las ciencias sociales. Tipos importantes de innovación pueden ser inter-
pretados en el contexto de la evolución de sistemas complejos como creación de trayectorias.
PALABRAS CLAVE: innovación, innovabililidad, modelos evolucionistas de la innovación, robustez, de-
pendencia y creación de trayectoria, protocolos.
* Correspondence to: Sergio F. Martínez. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Circuito Mario de la Cueva, s/n (Ciudad Universi-
taria, Distrito Federal, Mexico) – sfmar@filosoficas.unam.mx – http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8108-8400
How to cite: Martínez, Sergio F. (2019). «What is innovation? New lessons from biology»; Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, His-
tory and Foundations of Science, 34(3), 343-355. (https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18863).
Received: 11 December, 2017; Final version: 18 March, 2019.
ISSN 0495-4548 - eISSN 2171-679X / © 2019 UPV/EHU
  This article is distributed under the terms of the  
Creative Commons Atribution 4.0 Internacional License
 Sergio F. Martínez
344 Theoria, 2019, 34/3, 343-355
Introduction
The question of what innovation is started being discussed as a scientific question in the 
19th century, hand in hand with the development of the concept of evolution. Novelties or 
innovations allow us to establish biological distinctiveness or relatedness and more gener-
ally, to extrapolate from the existence of specific traits in a few organisms to more inclusive 
wholes. Darwin’s theory of natural selection, to the extent it explains how existing traits di-
versify, was a major contribution in this direction. It seems natural, as Darwin and most of 
his contemporaries believed, that this theory should extend its explanatory power to eluci-
date critical features of social life. Darwin, however, proposed a different version of the tra-
ditional account of this continuity. For most contemporaries of Darwin, this continuity 
was the consequence of the existence of universal laws (or mechanisms) that would support 
such continuity, and thus evolution was sufficient cause of all innovations. For Darwin, 
continuity was not a mere consequence of a law, it was rather the result of a contingent 
mode of operations of different causes.1 That is, Darwin promoted the idea that the conti-
nuity which his theory of organic evolution by natural selection establishes (among living 
forms), supported a controversial “thesis of continuity”, according to which, the methods 
and explanatory patterns of biology should have an important say in explanations of change 
in the social sciences, but not as a consequence of the existence of a law that would cover 
the continuity in question. Darwin’s thesis was brought into disreput during the 20th cen-
tury, as part of the discrediting of the relevance of biology to the social sciences.2 Recent ad-
vances in the biological sciences, and in particular in our understanding of the sources of 
innovation, suggest a way in which a version of the thesis of continuity can be reinstated 
as a methodological guide relating biological and social sciences. After showing the limi-
tations in the usual accounts of innovation in the social sciences and biology, I will briefly 
discuss recent views on innovation in biology that associate evolutionary innovation with 
the evolution of robust complex systems. This leads to a promising way of modeling inno-
vation as path-creation processes.
In the first section, I provide a brief summary of many accounts of innovation in the so-
cial sciences and identify a common underlying assumption. In the second section, I provide 
an overview of how innovation has been characterized in biology and point to the kinds of 
accounts which lead to my proposal. The third section shows how recent accounts of inno-
vation in biology can be extended to accounts of cultural innovation. The fourth section of-
fers three related reasons which support a revised version of the thesis of continuity.
1. The Many Faces of Innovation
What constitutes innovation has been a topic of increasing importance in the social 
sciences, education, and the biological and cognitive sciences since the 1960s. A growing 
1 As Wright formulated the idea: “strictly speaking, natural selection is not a cause at all, but it is the 
mode of operation of a certain quite limited class of causes” (1870, 293).
2 For a detailed account of how such separation took place from the perspective of the social sciences, 
see Degler (1991). 
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literature on innovation aims to establish innovation studies as an autonomous interdisci-
plinary endeavor, with one of the first models in this tradition proposed in 1962 by Everett 
Rogers, in his book Diffusion of Innovations. The key idea is that innovations have to over-
come the inertia caused by old ways of doing things, which leads specific people or com-
munities to reject an innovation, that from a “rational” or “purely economic” perspective 
should be accepted at once. In other words, innovation, in the form of concepts or technol-
ogies or ways of organization, happens or is generated somehow in society; and studies of 
innovation principally aim to explain the factors that impede their acceptance. As he tells 
it, Rogers became interested in the diffusion of agricultural innovations by observing how 
farmers in his native Iowa delayed the adoption of new ideas “that could be profitable for 
them” for several years (see Rogers 1995, xv-xvii). This basic idea has been extended in liter-
ally thousands of studies of diffusion of innovations, in practically all spheres of human ac-
tivity involving the adoption of new technologies: communication technology and market-
ing; the organization of hospitals, public health and the spread of antibiotics; agriculture; 
kindergarten, university and driving instruction; and practically any social activity involved 
in social changes. It is not then surprising that Rogers claims that the regularities brought to 
light by the diffusion model should ultimately explain different processes of social change (see 
Rogers 1995, xviii).
The diffusion model has been very influential. The underlying idea, that innovation 
can, and should be, explained by modeling the relation of a user with a technology, and 
the way the user reacts to and adopts (or not) the technology, is the point of departure 
for explanations of technological innovations well beyond the diffusion model. This us-
er-centered assumption is widespread in the whole field of “innovation studies”, although 
it disposes us to ignore questions about the sources of innovation. Ignoring such questions 
allows the model to be applied to many different kinds of processes, under well-controlled 
empirical conditions; nevertheless, considering that these sources are vital in understanding 
innovation, a serious limitation is built into this sort of approach.
Many models recognize the need to incorporate the sources of innovation into the dis-
cussion. Eric von Hippel, for example, in his well-known book The Sources of Innovation 
(1988), characterizes innovation as a process that is distributed across users, manufactur-
ers and suppliers, as well as other participants in the process. This model allows for an inter-
esting analysis of many innovations; nonetheless, innovation is still seen as a process taking 
place between specific agents and a particular technology, in such a way that the perception 
by an agent that a technology can be, or is, an innovation, is essential for the analysis. More 
to the point we want to make in this paper, the sources of innovation are classified according 
to function. An individual (or a firm, or a technology) will have different functional roles 
depending on the particular innovation being examined. With respect to innovations in air-
craft, Boeing is a manufacturer; but with respect to a metal-forming machine, it is a user.
There is no doubt that a functional account of the sources of innovation can lead to 
important insights. However, not all innovation is amenable to such an account. As we 
shall see, in biology and the social realm, important innovations are not related to their 
present functions, for example, structural features supporting capacities for change; such 
kinds of (what we will identify as) path-creation processes can be seen as supporting a re-
vised version of continuity.
In the preface to the Oxford Handbook of Innovation (2005), the editors (Fagerberg, 
Mowery and Nelson) introduce the book using the famous metaphor of the blind men 
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and the elephant. The literature on innovation—they say—is like the elephant perceived 
by each of the different blind men. Each author seems to be addressing a different issue. 
Their diagnosis is that such a variety of accounts over innovation arises because it is a mul-
tifaceted phenomenon that “cannot easily be squeezed into a particular branch of the social 
sciences or the humanities” (Fagerberg et al. 2005, v). But then, as they perceive it, the in-
creasing literature on innovation runs the risk of turning into isolated discussions, unable 
to communicate among themselves, and thus preventing the development of a more com-
plete understanding of the phenomenon. The book in question aims to give a picture of 
the whole.
I do not think the book is particularly successful in this regard. It is indeed a very good 
collection of separate articles, and some of them attempt to relate different questions and 
methods. But by assuming that a complete understanding of innovation can be expected 
by aggregating knowledge of different functional perspectives into an increasingly com-
plete picture, we disregard the systemic and path-dependent structuring of innovation that 
is closely related to its having resulted from an evolutionary process. This path–dependent 
structure of innovation is not fully captured by functional accounts of innovation, and as 
we shall see, such a structure might be crucial in understanding the way in which different 
innovations can be related to each other.
Yes, innovation is multifaceted, but in a sense that does not fit the metaphor of the ele-
phant. It is not an aggregative phenomenon, as suggested by the metaphor. Many processes 
of innovation are better modeled as systemic capacities enabling the scaffolding of innova-
tion through the facilitation of variations (as outlined in section 4).
Darwin suggested in later writings that the same explanatory pattern used in the Ori-
gin of Species to explain the branching biological diversity modeled in the tree of life could 
be used to explain human cultural evolution (Darwin 1871; Martínez 2000). This idea pre-
supposes the “thesis of continuity” according to which, an understanding of the continuity 
between human and animal experience and cognition was required in order to explain so-
cial (cultural) innovations. The rejection of this thesis goes hand in hand with an overhaul 
of the social sciences and their sharp separation from biology, which is the mark of the so-
cial sciences in the 20th century (see, for example: Richards 1987; Degler 1991). However, 
as we see below, the culprit is not the thesis of continuity as such, but the accompanying 
implicit assumption that innovations have to be explained in terms of (adaptive) function. 
This kind of explanation leaves us room to consider the important role history and tempo-
rality should play in an account of innovation.
One way in which history and temporality have been taken on board in accounts of 
innovation in the social sciences involves the introduction of the concept of path depend-
ence. A path-dependent process is a self-reinforcing process unfolding into one of several 
potential states. The state emerging from the process depends on the particular sequence 
(and ordering) of the events that unfold. The concept of path dependence has been used in 
economics and other disciplines to explain the emergence of novelty as serendipitous (Dosi 
1982). However, the assumption that historical accidents result in phenomena locking into 
suboptimal choices with full information seems to be hard to demonstrate (Liebowitz and 
Margolis 1990). This has led several authors to introduce a version of path dependence 
which they call “path creation”. In economics the idea is that to escape the selection pres-
sure of markets, one can design technology which, even if inefficient by today’s standards, 
can lead us into an innovative path. Path creation brings into play “not only the social and 
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institutional processes inherent in path dependence, but more importantly, the sociocog-
nitive processes of enactment that are involved in the creation of new states” (Garud and 
Karnoe 2001, 7).
This way of understanding path dependence and path creation can be very useful in so-
cial sciences in which the concept of agency can be taken as uncontroversial; cases in which, 
for example, the processes of enactment playing a crucial role in the designing of new paths 
are clear. We will show how a generalization of this idea of path creation can lead us to a re-
formulation of the thesis of continuity. Ultimately, the thesis of continuity is about the ex-
planation of the sense in which history matters for characterizing innovation. To make this 
connection clear, we have to introduce recent advances in our understanding of innovation 
in biology.
2. The Problem of Innovation in Biology
The way in which innovation was treated until recently in biology was closely related to 
the adaptive function of a trait considered novel. The diverse wing patterns of butterflies 
or the feather structure of birds are innovations, in the sense that such traits acquire new 
functions. As has often been pointed out, this way of understanding innovation as the fix-
ation of a trait in a population ignores the origin of the trait (the cause of the emergence of 
the variation). It is easy to understand the role of selection in optimizing a function, but it 
is harder to explain how selection plays a role in the origin of novel traits (Müller and New-
man 2005). Furthermore, particularly relevant for our purposes, such a characterization of 
innovation excludes from the outset the possibility of innovations that are not related to 
new functions.
Many alternative definitions have been proposed. One proposal is based on an idea al-
ready suggested by Darwin—that innovations could be the result of “secondary causes” not 
related to natural selection. The most famous explanation of innovation along these lines 
relies on the concept of “exaptation”, according to which, novelties may have originated 
for reasons unrelated to their present function. This explanation can account for many in-
novations, but there are limitations (see for example Newman et al. 2006; Moczek 2008). 
Overcoming these limitations prompts us to characterize innovations in a more systemic 
way, as path-creation processes being generated by specific capacities for change.
The basic idea is the recognition that specific structural features of a complex sys-
tem afford specific capacities for change and stability, and that such affordances apply 
equally for biological or cultural systems. These capacities grounded on systemic struc-
tures are discussed nowadays under different names in biology, but are mainly associ-
ated with facilitated variation (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005), or evolvability (Wagner 
2011; Calcott 2014). In these and other authors promoting related views, the basic idea 
is that the evolution of developmental resources explains innovation, thus opening the 
possibility that innovation in other complex systems, in which the evolution of devel-
opmental resources is the key for understanding change through time, can be explained 
likewise. As we shall see, such an account of innovation provides a way of reformulating 
Darwin’s thesis of continuity. But before this, we have to provide the framework for the 
thesis of continuity.
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3. From Biological to Cultural Evolution
As Maynard Smith famously characterizes Darwinian evolution by natural selection 
(1986), in order for Darwinian evolution to occur, it is sufficient that we have a popula-
tion of entities satisfying the following properties: 1) the entities must be able to multiply; 
2) there must be variation within the population; and 3) some of the variations must be he-
reditary. Maynard Smith shows that if these conditions are met, natural selection is an in-
evitable outcome. But in order for this account of evolution to be more than an (abstract) 
outline of Darwin’s theory, we have to say what the population in question is, what the 
units of hereditary variations are, in specific cases, and what the specific processes bringing 
about variation are. This requires an interpretation of the abstract framework that usually 
leads to what is called a “neo-Darwinian” account of evolution.
During the first decades of the 20th century, a paradigmatic “neo-Darwinian” inter-
pretation of the theory of natural selection developed, that aimed to establish evolutionary 
theory in mechanistic principles. Neo-Darwinism starts with the incorporation of Men-
del’s law and transmission genetics as the basis for a characterization of the theory of he-
redity that Darwin lacked. Neo-Darwinism claims that genetics can give a precise answer to 
evolutionary questions, under the assumption that the fundamental unit of heredity is the 
gene, and that genetics provides the details of the processes leading to its inheritance. This 
gene-centered view of evolution has profound implications for the modeling of cultural 
evolution and for an account of cultural innovations. Since in the neo-Darwinian model of 
evolution, the phenotype reproduces but is not inherited, and the genotype is inherited but 
is not (directly) reproduced, it is possible to avoid the question of the origin of hereditary 
variation.3
Following neo-Darwinism, the first well-known models of cultural evolution assumed 
that innovations were particulate and that an analogous blackboxing of the question about 
the origin of hereditary variation not only was possible but indeed desirable. It would al-
low for the idealized transmission mechanism to pass information from head to head and 
implicitly, at least, reduced innovation to nothing more than a random mutation of a 
gene-like entity with a high fitness. Memetics is a well-known label under which such ac-
counts have been developed (see Blackmore 1999; Aunger 2002). Two key assumptions 
of memetics are relevant to the present discussion. Memetics assumes that cultural inno-
vations are particulate (or discrete) and that transmission of information takes place from 
head to head. However, as several critiques have pointed out, cultural innovations can very 
seldom be modeled as particulate (or discrete) (Henrich et al. 2002; Wimsatt and Griese-
mer 2007). Also, as Sperber (1996) already argued, even if one accepts the basic framework, 
ideas cannot be modeled as directly transmitted from one brain to another, since their 
transmission is mediated by observation. Someone observes a certain behavior and then 
infers the underlying representation or idea that leads to this behavior. Thus, processes of 
(psychological) inference play a crucial role in biasing the ideas that are transmitted. The 
nature of cognitive processes producing social learning and supporting (via inference and 
joint action) the transmission of innovations help us to explain how innovations are pro-
3 Contrary to what Darwin thought, namely that hereditary variations are acquired through develop-
ment, neo-Darwinism assumes that the origin of variation is random.
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duced and transmitted through generations of agents. But that means acknowledging that 
the inheritance mechanisms of cultural innovations cannot blackbox the specific mech-
anisms supporting the stable transmission of innovations through generations of agents. 
It can be argued that, as far as such mechanisms promoting innovation can (and should) 
be characterized through generations of agents, these mechanisms are developmental re-
sources (effective as part and parcel of specific systemic or organizational environments). 
Thus biology should not be seen as merely a source of analogies for the construction of explana-
tory models of cultural change, but as allowing us to identify capacities for systemic innovation. 
In the next section, I will briefly summarize three reasons supporting this view, and elabo-
rate on the sense that this points to a version of the thesis of continuity.
4. From Biological Innovation to Cultural Innovation
There are three important interrelated reasons why we should pay attention to systemic in-
novations in biology, in order to advance our understanding of the phenomena of innova-
tion in the cultural (or social) realm.
a) The first is that, insofar as recent accounts of evolution recognize the importance 
of the causal interaction between development and evolution, the role of inher-
itance in evolution cannot be reduced to the question of what the “unit” of he-
redity is. What the right unit of heredity is, will depend on the mechanism of in-
heritance that is relevant in explaining the reproduction of the population in 
question. In other words, what the right unit of heredity is depends on the lineage 
that the unit is supposed to explain, and thus on the processes of development on which 
we want to focus our attention. The motivation for assuming that a task of any 
model of cultural evolution is the identification of the “right” unit of heredity is 
gone; different inheritance systems promote different units (Caporael et al. 2014).
b) The second related reason is that if “niche construction” is considered part of the 
evolutionary process, what is biological and what is cultural evolution cannot be 
separated into two sharply distinct causal processes (Laland and Brown 2002).
c) The third reason is that, as recent discussions about innovation in biology make 
clear, innovation should be understood as a (kind of) process that can (and should) 
be described as identifiable in different levels and kinds of organizations, in or-
der to really characterize it (Parter et al. 2008; Wagner 2011; Brigandt and Love 
2012). Next, I proceed to elaborate on these reasons and discuss their relevance, 
the third one in particular, for my purpose in this paper.
Neo-Darwinism assumed a sharp separation between heredity and development, arising 
from the modeling of heredity in terms of chromosomes carrying genes that pass from one 
generation to another undisturbed by the environment. As Eva Jablonka and others have 
emphasized, this is only one of the inheritance systems that matter in understanding evo-
lution.4 Jablonka distinguishes four inheritance systems: genetic, epigenetic, behavioral and 
4 Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981); Boyd and Richerson (1985) have long discussed the importance 
of a second non-genetic inheritance system that is able to codirect genetic evolution. 
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symbolic (see Jablonka and Lamb 2005). Epigenetic inheritance systems underlie the trans-
mission of the functional state of genes and cellular structures through cellular heredity sys-
tems that constitute cell lineages (associated with the formation of different organs in hu-
man beings, for example). Behavioral inheritance systems are involved in the transmission 
of behavioral information through social learning in mammals and other animals. And ac-
cording to Jablonka, symbolic inheritance systems are what underlie our capacity for lan-
guage and rationality, and make us special in the biological world.
We do not need to accept in toto the categories proposed by Jablonka in order to dis-
cuss nongenic inheritance systems. I suspect that at the very least, a sharp distinction be-
tween behavioral and symbolic inheritance is hard to maintain; but what matters for us 
here, is that there are good reasons for thinking of different inheritance systems that can be 
characterized as capacities for the generation and maintenance of different lineages of or-
ganizations (cell structures, behavioral habits, human languages, cultural traditions, prac-
tices). Innovations make sense in the context of these lineages. An innovation in a liver cell 
is (an heritable) change in the way a certain substance is processed, for example; a change 
that has implications for the functioning of the liver.
Similarly, a technological innovation is not just a change in the physical components of 
a tool (or device, or organization). It is a change that allows the tool to be a better tool for 
a particular task, even if that change makes the tool unsuitable for other tasks. A knife for 
butchering an animal is not very good for cutting vegetables. In each case, an innovation is 
a change that has implications for the reproducibility and diversification of a lineage of or-
ganisms or artifacts, which in turn are constitutive of lineages of structures or forms of or-
ganization that arise from the interaction of different inheritance systems.
The second reason is a direct consequence of giving due importance to the recent char-
acterization of evolutionary theory as niche construction theory, or more broadly, a conse-
quence of taking the relation between development and evolution seriously. During most 
of the 20th century, pointing to the way in which an author appealed to biology to argue 
for a thesis in social science was exposing a serious defect in the explanation. In the second 
half of the 20th century, several attempts to incorporate evolutionary theory in the expla-
nation of social phenomena were put forward and strongly criticized, sociobiology (Wil-
son 1975) and evolutionary psychology (Barkow et al. 1992), among others. All of these 
accounts assume a one-way causal link between biology and culture. In cases in which feed-
back from human behavior to genetic evolution is considered, it is assumed that this influ-
ence takes place by generating mutations (neo-Lamarckism), or by changing the probabil-
ities of survival. Since Lamarckism was considered a dead end, most approaches took the 
latter route—in which culture can have a say in biological evolution, but only by allowing 
the possibility that it also plays a role in human adaptations. It is in this sense that, for ex-
ample, evolutionary psychology talks of prehistoric minds as tool boxes of task-specific ad-
aptations that were acquired by the human mind in the Stone Age. Such approaches often 
assume that Homo sapiens is the only species with the ability to modify its own selective en-
vironment, and thus the assumption goes hand in hand with the idea that symbolic think-
ing is a prerequisite for such ability.
Niche construction theory takes a more radical view of the relation between biol-
ogy and culture. It elaborates on the well-known observation that organisms modify their 
environments to focus on those modifications that have evolutionary or ecological con-
sequences, inherited through nongenetic systems of inheritance. Such nongenetic in-
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heritances generate a form of feedback in evolution. The selection and modification of hab-
itats is an example of niche construction present in plants and animals (Odling-Smee 1988; 
McNally and Brown 2015). Artifacts like burrow systems or ants’ nests have generated se-
lection pressures leading to the evolution of thermoregulation systems, the forms of organ-
ization and distinct behaviors present in defense, or routines for maintenance or repair. 
Artifacts like the Acheulean axe have generated selection pressures that brought about the 
evolution of the kind of social cognition distinctive of homo sapiens.
In either case, the separation of the evolutionary processes in question in biological and 
cultural processes is not fundamental. Unless we want to maintain the dogma that there is 
only one culture, the sort distinctive of human beings, there is no reason to attempt to dis-
tribute, as a matter of fundamental importance, causal responsibilities to culture and biol-
ogy (for an elaboration of these ideas, see for example Laland et al. 2000). The key point for 
us is that the claim that niche construction can have evolutionary consequences which are 
not explainable by natural selection alone, leads to the view that key human innovations re-
quire explanatory resources beyond those at the disposal of adaptationism.5 In particular, it 
leads to the recognition that explanation of current function is not enough to explain cur-
rent structure.
Now I focus on the third reason for taking biological innovation as scaffold for mod-
eling social innovation (as a version of the thesis of continuity). The geneticist Hugo de 
Vries (1905) reinforced Wallace’s idea that natural selection could not explain crucial in-
novations like the human mind, when he said that “natural selection may explain the sur-
vival of the fittest, but it cannot explain the arrival of the fittest.” In his book The Origins of 
Evolutionary Innovations (2011), Andreas Wagner quotes De Vries, adding that this ques-
tion about the origin of innovations is still present. He aims to provide evidence for the 
thesis that it requires more than a combination of natural selection and random change to 
account for evolutionary innovations. As he reminds us, many evolutionary innovations 
have been studied in great detail, but “case studies cannot provide the general perspective 
needed to answer this question” (Wagner 2011, 2). Hence why he thinks there is a need for 
a general explanatory framework that could account for innovability (the capacity to inno-
vate) in biology and beyond. He does not pretend to provide such a framework, but only 
contribute to what he considers should be building blocks of such a theory.
In order to provide concrete steps towards a theory of innovability, Wagner pays at-
tention to three classes of systems that, as he shows, are central to innovation: large meta-
bolic networks, regulatory circuits, and macromolecules. The main message of the book is 
that these systems are components of genotype networks that are necessary in order to un-
derstand all biological innovations. Moreover, he shows that a suitable abstracted notion of 
network organization can be traced from macromolecules to (some) technological systems, 
and thus through all major evolutionary transitions. What is particularly important for the 
point I want to make, is that the identification of such distinctive network organizations, as 
Wagner shows, requires the identification of a capacity through different levels of organization. 
As will become clearer below, Wagner’s point can be reformulated as saying that innova-
tion should be understood in terms of capacity for change that is path dependent.
5 I am, of course, focusing on explanatory adaptationism (as opposed to what is often called empirical 
adaptationism): see Godfrey Smith (2001).
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Wagner’s point has been made by several other authors in different terms and con-
texts. Csete and Doyle introduce the concept of protocol (see for example 2002). Proto-
cols are the organizing principles underlying the modular structure of a complex system 
(like a macromolecule or a Boeing 777). Modularity means different things for different 
people, but the core idea is that modules are parts or subsystems of a larger system, which 
function as relatively stable units with respect to changes in the larger system. Modular-
ity has been a key topic in biology for a long time; however, Csete and Doyle’s claim is that 
protocols are more important than modules for modeling biological complexity. Proto-
cols are prescriptions or constraints that describe the possible architectures, rules or codes 
of conduct. As Csete and Doyle put it, “protocols here are rules that prescribe allowed in-
terfaces between modules, permitting system functions that could not be achieved by iso-
lated modules” (2002, 1666). They give the example of Lego pieces as modules, the shapes 
that allow one type of piece to fit with another; the snap would be the basic Lego protocol. 
Protocols are more important than modules in understanding complexity, precisely in the 
sense that matters to us: protocols refer to the capacity of the system to innovate, namely, 
to generate new architectures and functions through the display of protocols that are ro-
bust. Robustness allows for innovations that in turn can function as scaffolds for other in-
novations. Protocols are not mere rules, and not just any rule is a protocol. A protocol fa-
cilitates the layering of additional protocols, that in turn “fit” with other protocols through 
feedback and other means of appropriate signaling. Thus the sense in which protocols are 
more important than modules (for characterizing innovation) can be formulated roughly 
as follows: biological (and social) complexity cannot simply be explained in terms of functions 
and adaptations, but require us to consider protocols and feedback loops that provide robustness 
and evolvability. Laws about (transfer of) energy or about the modular structure of materi-
als, for example, require less control and are less relevant in understanding the complexity 
of a system, than robustness. Robustness, and not optimality or adaptiveness, should be the 
main focus for models of complexity.
In several writings, Kirschner and Gerhart propose a “theory of facilitated variation” 
(FV) (see for example Gerhart and Kirschner 2007), which aims to characterize different 
notions of innovation in biology (arising in genetics, developmental biology and evolution, 
among others), departing from the insight that organisms are designed so that random ge-
netic changes are channeled in phenotypic directions that are potentially useful. Of course, 
the main objection to this sort of theory has been that it is hard to explain how FV spon-
taneously emerges during evolution. Kirschner and Gerhardt provide experimental and 
historical evidence for FV in several writings (see in particular 2005). Parter and co-au-
thors (2008) develop computer simulations of logic circuits and RNA secondary structure 
which show that FV is enhanced in environments that are somehow constrained to change 
in a systematic way, such that the varying environments are made of the same set of sub-
goals, but in different combinations. Their finding is that systems which change under the 
guidance of (stable) protocols (that constrain the stability of the units of change) tend to 
remember their history and have the capacity to generalize to new environments. This is 
precisely the sense in which I have said above that innovation is path dependent. The orig-
inal way of understanding path dependence in economy identifies such a dependency as a 
constraint on innovation. A series of contingent facts ends up “locking in” the QWERTY 
keyboard, for example. But path dependency can be seen not only as historical (contin-
gent) constraints on future processes, but as the protocols that guide those future processes 
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through constraints by restricting them to combinations of a given set of subgoals (a given 
set of possible interfaces). This formulation of path dependency can be seen as a more gen-
eral version of the concept of path creation proposed by Garud and Karnoe (see section 1). 
Calcott (2014) formulates a similar idea in terms of a shift “from adaptationism to evolv-
ability”. Adaptationism is understood by Calcott as implying that current structure can be 
explained in terms of current function; but this is questionable, because slight variants of 
a system facilitating innovation can play an important role in such an explanation, to the 
extent that protocols reduce the number of accessible variants, and thus projects path de-
pendency into the future (into path creation). Calcott focuses on the proposal that there 
are underlying universal principles that explain the organization of biological and (com-
plex) technological systems, and emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between two 
explanatory tasks: on the one hand, the task usually associated with adaptability, which ex-
plains the capacity for a system to achieve some particular task at a time; and on the other 
hand, the task of explaining the capacities of systems to change over time. It is this second 
diachronic goal which is the explanandum of evolvability and that is involved in accounts of 
innovation in terms of protocols (Calcott 2014). This is a kind of path dependency in which 
innovations result from protocols that take dependency on the past as an explanatory re-
source for the creation of alternatives constrained by such protocols.
5. Conclusions
To the extent that the path dependence in question supports the right abstractions (and 
generalizations) from biology to the social realm, we can take such path dependence as 
modeling the kind of continuity that Darwin was aiming to characterize between biology 
and the social sciences. It suggests that innovation (at least in complex systems satisfying 
some very general conditions) has to be modeled as a phenomenon taking place across dif-
ferent levels of organization; and thus, attempts to characterize innovation processes as ag-
gregative are misleading. Innovation is robust path dependence with the capacity to facil-
itate new organizational achievements i.e. path creation. The continuity from biology to 
certain technological achievements has led to productive ways of modeling specific techno-
logical innovations, like electronic circuits (Wagner 2011) and software engineering (Cal-
cott 2014). The key insight—that it is robustness and not function that we have to focus 
on, to model innovation as a kind of process across different levels of organization—is an 
idea with a promising future. It means paying attention to hierarchical ontologies of so-
cial processes, as opposed to the traditional tendency to construct models of technologi-
cal change based on flat ontologies that lead to modeling innovation as an aggregative phe-
nomenon.6
6 For an interesting suggestion pointing to the need to pay attention to hierarchical ontologies in mod-
els of technological change, see the work of Geels (for example 2010). 
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